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ABSTRACT 
This paper describes an approach to detect unknown event pat-
terns. In this context, an event is not only something that happens, 
but also something that can be analysed. This task is processed by 
a Complex Event Processing (CEP) engine. CEP is an emerging 
technology for detecting known patterns of events and correlating 
them to complex events in real-time. In order to reach the goal of 
finding unknown patterns, several known detection algorithms are 
discussed. In our work, we focus on discriminant analysis used for 
recognizing unknown patterns for the use case of credit card 
transactions and the fraud problem connected with this kind of 
payment. It is necessary to develop new methods of fraud detec-
tion and prevention because of the negative impacts for vendors 
and customers caused by credit card fraudsters at present. At the 
same time we would like to make provisions for the more sophis-
ticated fraud methods that will occur in the future.  
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
I.5.2 [Pattern Recognition]: Design Methodology – Pattern 
analysis; H.4.2 [Information Systems Applications]: Types of 
Systems – Decision support (e.g., MIS) 
General Terms 
Algorithms, Design, Experimentation, Security, Languages 
Keywords 
Complex Event Processing, Event Driven Architecture, Service 
Oriented Computing, Business Activity Monitoring, Discriminant 
Analysis, Fraud Detection 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
With headwords like ubiquitous and pervasive computing or 
ambient intelligence, a new computing paradigm has been estab-
lished in the last ten years. Networked computing technology now 
penetrates almost all aspects of our life and working environment. 
Most papers that are written on these topics discuss them from a 
mere technical point of view [27]. This is not surprising, as tre-
mendous advances have been achieved in the last years, e.g. 
sophisticated sensors. But there are also initiatives which consider 
these themes in the direction of organisations and users. This area 
is called ambient business intelligence which can be seen as the 
next generation of the widespread business intelligence (BI) 
systems. Data analysis methods in traditional BI systems rely on 
predefined cubes which do not reflect the real-time-business [11]. 
One central concern of next generation BI systems is the ability to 
deal with real-time data that originates e.g. from operations, mes-
sage queues or web clicks [24]. This is fundamental for realizing 
predictive business systems. This is an environment where users 
can access data they need in real-time, analyze it and predict 
possible problems and trends with the aim of optimising enter-
prise decisions [6]. One part of predictive business and a solution 
for delivering information in real-time is complex event process-
ing (CEP). CEP platforms scan low level events, e.g. on the net-
work level like SNMP traps or database commits. Such events, 
occur in the global event cloud [20, pp.28-29] of an enterprise, 
without any business relevant semantics. They generate complex, 
business level events in real-time if a predefined event pattern 
matches to an occurring combination of events, e.g. for credit card 
fraud or intrusion detection and prevention. 
 
A CEP engine will be able to react to specific events in real-time. 
Event processing is endorsed by software analysts and vendors as 
one of the emerging styles of programming and software architec-
ture (e.g. the Event Driven Architecture (EDA) [26]). Today 
many applications require event-based monitoring capabilities 
ranging from digital data streaming systems, continuous query 
systems, system monitoring and management tools to event-
driven workflow engines. There is a wide and growing interest in 
event processing techniques both for extending the capabilities 
and for improving the performance and ease of use of such EDA 
systems. While industry solutions are evolving, the scientific 
community also deals with fundamental issues behind the model-
ling, the representation, the usability and the optimization of event 
processing [26]. Event processing is still a young discipline. 
Officially it has been founded and established as a discipline with 
a community around it in March 2006 [12]. Event processing 
systems are widely used in enterprise integration applications, 
ranging from time-critical systems, agile process integration 
systems, managements of services and processes, delivery of 
information services, and awareness of business situations. There 
is a range of event processing middleware capabilities, including 
publish-subscribe services, which have been incorporated into 
standards such as CORBA and JMS, and into commercial sys-
tems, mediation services such as event transformation, aggrega-
tion, split and composition, and event pattern detection [26]. 
2. EVENT CLOUD, TYPES OF EVENTS, 
EVENT PATTERNS 
In the global event cloud of an organization many kinds of events 
exist. According to [20, p.88] an event is a record of an activity in 
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a system and may be related to other events. It has the following 
aspects: 
 
• Form: These are the formal attributes of an event, such as 
timestamp, place or originator. 
• Significance: It is the activity, which signifies the event. 
• Relativity: This describes the relationship to with other 
events. An event can be related to other events by time, cau-
sality, and aggregation. It has the same relations as the signi-
fied activity of the event [20, p.88]. 
 
Since 2006 a discussion on the proper definition of the event 
concept has started inside the CEP community. According to a 
very wide interpretation “an event is simply anything what hap-
pens”. Other members of the community suggest a more restric-
tive definition: “an event is a notable activity that happens” [7]. In 
comparison with transactions, which can change permanently, 
events are static. If a transaction changes, a new event of the new 
state will be created [16, p.6]. Events can be high level business 
events like “depositing funds into a bank account” or low level 
events like acknowledging the arrival of a TCP-packet. By the use 
of CEP-engines, low-level events can be aggregated to high level 
events. This can be achieved with known event patterns.  
2.1  Known Event Patterns 
Known event patterns can be derived from heuristics e.g. from a 
specific business activity monitoring view (BAM-view). The 
event patterns are implemented using event pattern languages 
(EPL). An EPL must have the following properties: 
• Power of expression: It must provide relational operations to 
describe the relationships between events. 
• Notational simplicity: It must have a simple notation in order 
to write patterns succinctly. 
• Precise semantics: It must provide a mathematically precise 
concept of matching. 
• Scalable pattern matching: It must have an efficient pattern 
matcher in order to be able to handle large amounts of events 
in real-time [20, p.146]. 
Examples of EPL’s are RAPIDE-EPL, STRAW-EPL, StreamSQL 
and there are still ongoing research efforts [7, 14, 9]. 
An event-pattern written with STRAW-EPL looks like this: 
Element  Declarations 
Variables  Node N1, Node N2, Data D, Bit B, Time T, 
Time T1, Time T2 
Event Types Send(Data D, Bit B, Time T), Receive(Data 
D, Bit B, Time T),  
  Ack (Data D, Bit B, Time T), 
RecAck (Data D, Bit B, Time T)  
Rational operators -> (causes) 
Pattern  Send (D, B, T1) -> Receive (D, B) ->  Ack (B) 
-> RecAck (B, T2) 
Context test T2 – T1 < 10 sec 
Action  create Warning (N1, N2, T1, T2) 
This pattern describes a TCP data transmission. If the time be-
tween the send-event and the recack-event is more then 10 sec-
onds, a warning-event will be created. This warning-event is a 
complex event with the parameters node N1, node N2, time T1 
and time T2 [20, p.117]. Examples for the use of known event 
patterns are discussed in chapter 3.  
2.2  Unknown Event Patterns 
In contrast to known event patterns, unknown event patterns can 
not be derived from heuristics based on an existing BAM view. 
They did not exist in the past respectively they have not been 
recognized so far. An unknown pattern could be found with the 
help of event processing agents by analysing the event cloud of an 
organisation and using specific algorithms to detect it. This ap-
proach is discussed in detail in chapter 4. 
2.3  Risks of the of Patterns Approach 
There are also risks connected with the patterns approach. On the 
one hand, a pattern can be too specific, so it does not match situa-
tions where a reaction is necessary. The reason for not reacting is 
that events defined in the pattern are not occurring. On the other 
hand an event pattern can be too general and fires too often. The 
result is that the pattern produces alerts in situations, where it is 
not necessary [8, p.3]. Therefore it is important to find the right 
combination of relevant events for fulfilling the approach of 
VIRT (Valuable Information at the Right Time) which is con-
cerned with filtering, compacting and delivering information to 
the right place at the right time [15]. Moreover event patterns 
must be continuously improved and updated. 
Another peril of using patterns lies in the “acclimatization factor”. 
If whatever complex process relies on the accurate and automated 
processing of events, the user or business case gets used to the 
fact that any occurring events are automatically handled correctly. 
But especially in the case of unknown event patterns, i.e. a com-
bination of events that has not been considered so far and there-
fore no appropriate handling of these events has been defined, the 
automatic handling of events may not lead to the desired results, 
e.g. important events may not be taken care of. But since the user 
or business case is used to relying on the automated process the 
wrong or incomplete results may not be noticed.
 
3. TECHNIQUES TO DETECT KNOWN 
EVENT PATTERNS 
There are a high number of domains, which are interested in 
finding known event patterns on the base of occurring events at 
runtime, e.g. health care, military or insurance companies to name 
just a few. The following use cases are focused on the detection of 
known event patterns in the banking domain.  
3.1  Use Case: Fraud Detection  
The types of fraud in the banking domain are versatile. They 
reach from phishing over cross-site scripting to credit card fraud. 
Some vendors are focusing on developing anti-fraud systems [16, 
p.9]. The event pattern shown in fig. 1 is used for fraud detection 
in a billing process. If a bill submitted for payment on the billing 
system, has an invalid customer or billing information, an email to 
the billing manager will be sent. Fig.2 shows a more complex 
example for a known event pattern. 
If one day after a submitted transaction the address or the pass-
word is changed and a loss of the card is reported while invalid 
transactions on this account have occurred in the last ten days, 
then the defined actions will be executed. In this case, the reac-
tions predefined in the pattern are  
1. Putting activities on referral by the account system, 
2. Investigating the transaction by the personal event manager and  
3. Suspending the transaction.  
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 Figure 1: Pattern for fraud detection in a billing  
process [2] 
 
Figure 2: Pattern for fraud detection in the case of transac-
tion processing [2] 
Fig. 3 shows the evolution of multiple invalid transactions in the 
last ten days before 03/15/2005. 
 
Figure 3: Evolution of invalid transactions [2] 
Fig. 4 documents the trend of password changing in the last 10 
days before 04/06/2005. 
 
Figure 4: Trend of password changes[2] 
CEP platforms typically deliver many more patterns for fraud 
detection (see [2] for details). According to a recent Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) report, its consumer sentinel complaint data-
base received more than 635.000 consumer fraud and identity 
theft complaints in the year 2004. Furthermore, a 2003 study by 
the US-based Identity Theft Resource Center, a non-profit organi-
zation focusing on identity theft, estimated the business commu-
nity losses between $40.000 and $92.000 per name in fraudulent 
costs [2]. These total costs consist of: 
• Direct fraud costs: Costs caused by successful fraudsters. 
• Costs of manual order review: These are the costs of check-
ing orders manually by humans. 
• Costs of reviewing tools: These are the costs of tools which 
check orders automatically.  
• Costs of rejecting orders: These are lost turnovers caused by 
falsely evaluated orders [8, p.10].  
In the next paragraph we discuss well-known pattern matching 
algorithms from application domains like information retrieval or 
artificial intelligence. Our goal is to find out whether such algo-
rithms may be used for event pattern detection.  
3.2 Algorithms Used for Pattern Matching 
and Recognition 
The following methods and algorithms are used for detecting 
known event patterns. They are also candidates currently dis-
cussed as solutions for detecting unknown event patterns [6]: 
• Deterministic approaches: They describe processes, which 
are stringently causal. E.g. event A causes event B and event 
B is leading to event C and no other variant is possible [10]. 
• Probabilistic approaches: In contrast to deterministic ap-
proaches, probabilistic approaches are not stringently causal. 
E.g. event A causes event B with a specific probability and 
event C with a different probability [1].  
• Cluster operations: These methods are creating groups (clus-
ters) of objects out of a basic set of objects on the basis of 
specific criteria. Many kinds of cluster algorithms exist, e.g. 
the k-nearest Neighbour algorithm (KNN) [25]. 
• Discriminant analysis: This method checks the quality of 
existing group divisions by means of classification methods, 
which are based on discriminant functions [21].  
• Fuzzy set theory: This approach extends the classical binary 
truth function in set theory by introducing degrees of mem-
bership of an object to a set in the interval from 0 to 1 [13]. 
• Bayesian Belief Networks: This method generates inferences 
based on unsure information. It is a network graph whose 
nodes are states and the edges between the nodes describe 
the dependences between a pair of states [18].  
• Dempster-Shafer method: This method is also known as the 
evidence-theory. It combines information from different 
sources to a total conclusion [28]. 
• Hidden Markov models (HMM): This method describes two 
random processes, one of which is hidden. With the help of 
the probability distribution of the known process the prob-
ability distribution of the hidden process is determined [23]. 
These algorithms are only a sample of the methods used for pat-
tern recognition. For our goal to detect unknown event patterns, 
we will use combinations of these algorithms. This is also men-
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tioned in [5, p.6] for the domain of intrusion detection (see also 
chap. 6). Our fist step will be to investigate discriminant analysis. 
3.3 Known Fraud Scenarios and Methods 
Used for Handling Fraud Management 
According to [8, p.2], a survey which interviewed 150 UK online 
retailers about their experiences with fraud and how they defend 
themselves against crime, fraudsters have a wide range of tricks. 
The most popular method of them is to use stolen credit cards. In 
this context, they try multiple identity details with the same credit 
card number until they find a combination which is able to pass 
the security system. This way, they often test a stolen card by 
ordering small volumes of low-value products. After a test order 
is successful, they will continue to use the stolen card until the 
limit is reached. Moreover, thieves often use card holders’ real 
addresses for placing an order and afterwards change the delivery 
address to an address where they can pick up the goods. This can 
be achieved by contacting the specific call centre before the order 
is delivered. Furthermore, retailers often report problems with 
foreign orders, especially orders which originate from Africa. 
According to the survey, retailers are most afraid of fraudsters 
which use sophisticated methods just as the above mentioned 
identity theft [8, p.13]. In order to meet these threats, most of the 
retailers increased their investments in fraud management be-
tween 10% and 100% over the year [8, p.12]. In this context they 
use fraud management methods which are shown in fig. 5.  
 
Figure 5: Fraud management methods used by UK online 
retailers [8, p.9] 
Most of the consulted retailers (79%) use Card Verification Num-
ber (CVN) in the year 2006. The purpose of CVN is to verify that 
the person placing an order has the credit card in its possession. 
To accomplish this, the CVN is requested during an online pur-
chase process. Address Verification Service (AVS) is also widely 
used by the online retailers (71%). In addition, manual review by 
humans is a popular method to enhance the credit card security 
(65%). Fig. 5 also shows that many retailers use a combination of 
two or more fraud management methods, e.g. manual review after 
automatic detection tools as well as CVN. 
3.4 Shortcomings of Fraud Detection Systems 
In spite of widespread implementations of AVS and CVN, these 
systems offer some weaknesses: For example, AVS displays a 
problem if the address of the card holder is not up to date. In this 
case, the address will be flagged as invalid. The result is that AVS 
has a significant rate of false-positives. On the other hand the 
verification number of CVN can be obtained by fraudsters [8, 
p.8]. Furthermore, the “Hot Card File” which contains informa-
tion about stolen or copied cards is not always a reliable source of 
data and can be out of date for several days. This is because the 
file depends on card owners to recognize that a fraud has hap-
pened and report it [8, p.10]. In addition, sophisticated fraudsters 
know the length of time a card is registered in the file or try tac-
tics to remove it from the file e.g. by flooding the file with false 
card numbers until the targeted card number drops out of the list.  
In general, according to [2], traditional anti-fraud systems nar-
rowly focus on transactional activities such as opening a new 
credit card account or changing a password. But these events 
often happen in disparate systems at different times and so they 
may not be detected by current anti-fraud detection technology 
[2]. Moreover, because of more sophisticated fraud methods, the 
known kinds of fraud patterns change permanently: Thus, they are 
not detectable, but leave traces in the form of unknown fraud 
event combinations. One approach to find unknown event patterns 
will be discussed in the following chapter.  
4. AN APPROACH FOR DETECTING 
UNKNOWN EVENT PATTERNS USING 
DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS  
We suggest the scenario shown in fig. 6 as a possible approach to 
recognize unknown event patterns:  
 
Figure 6: An Event Processing Agent detects unknown event 
patterns in a CEP engine 
Event processing adapters map low level events occurring in the 
global event cloud or respectively event streams from their spe-
cific structure into a standardized format (e.g. the Common Base 
Event (CBE) [17]) which can be interpreted by an Event Process-
ing Agent (EPA) inside the CEP engine. If an EPA detects an 
unknown pattern which seems to be a fraud attempt or in other 
words a suspicious combination of events as determined by using 
e.g. discriminant analysis, it will react with a predefined action, 
like sending an alert to a target system. But the best solution 
would be to start a preventing action which stops the fraud at-
tempt before it is finished. Furthermore, the suspicious pattern 
will be saved in a database of unknown event patterns. The next 
step is a verification process by a responsible person who classi-
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fies the new pattern as harmless or as a dangerous fraud pattern. 
This operation is followed by an update of the database which 
stores the known event patterns. The next paragraphs exemplify 
the application of discriminant analysis as an appropriate ap-
proach for identifying unknown event patterns. 
4.1  The Principle of Discriminant Analysis 
Discriminant analysis is a multivariate statistical method. Such 
methods analyse multidimensional data in order to help finding 
decisions in economical applications or to discover relationships 
between certain kinds of data. Discriminant analysis in particular 
consists of the following functions: 
• It checks the quality of membership of objects in predefined 
groups of objects in order to discover the optimal discrimina-
tion between the groups.   
• It allocates a new occurring object into one of the existing 
groups of objects [21, p.300]. 
The process to determine the optimal group a new object belongs 
to can be described as follows: First, the parameters relevant for 
distinguishing the groups must be defined. On the basis of these 
variables, discriminant functions that separate the groups will be 
calculated. In this step the multi-group case or the two-group case 
can be applied. In the two-group case, only one discriminant 
function exists. The form of this function depends on the number 
of the variables differentiating the groups, e.g. if two appropriate 
variables exist, the function will have the form: 
Y = V1*X1+V2*X2 
X1 and X2 are the values of the specific parameters of the new 
object. V1 and V2 are the coefficients of the discriminant func-
tion. These coefficients can be computed by including the values 
of the parameters of the existing objects in a linear system of 
equations. The result is Y, which is the discriminant value of the 
new occurring object. The next step is to compare the computed 
discriminant value of the new object with the so called critical 
discriminant value. The critical discriminant value of a discrimi-
nant function is the midpoint of the average discriminant values of 
the two groups [29]. If the computed discriminant value of the 
new object is greater than the critical discriminant value, than the 
new object will be allocated to the group of objects with the 
greater discriminant values (and vice versa). Another way to 
define the membership of an object to a group is to use Fisher’s 
linear discriminant function [21, p.318] which has a critical dis-
criminant value of null. In this way, the group membership of an 
object depends on the algebraic sign of the discriminant value of 
the specific object.  
In the multi-group case, more discriminant functions exist. The first 
function compares group A with the summation of the other groups. 
If the new object does not belong to group A, the second discrimi-
nant function compares group B with the remaining groups without 
A. This algorithm is finished when the optimal group for the new 
object is found. So the maximal count of discriminant functions is: 
number of groups – 1. This classification process is described in 
more detail in [21, pp.300-333]. In order to accomplish a discrimi-
nant analysis, the following preconditions should be fulfilled: 
• The number of parameters should be greater than the number 
of groups. 
• The range of the sample should be double the amount of the 
number of the parameters. 
• The basis data should be normally distributed. 
• An object must not belong to more than one group. 
• The values of the variables must be metrically scalable.  
Typical use cases for discriminant analyses are: 
• On the basis of balance key figures a bank decides whether a 
company is creditworthy or not. 
• On the basis of patient data, diseases can be recognized 
earlier.  
• On the basis of aptitude tests, the success of beginners in a 
certain job could be predicted.  
A new use case for discriminant analysis will be an approach to 
classify events in order to recognize unknown event patterns.  
4.2 Fraud Detection Based on CEP and  
Discriminant Analysis 
The first step in order to detect suspicious patterns by means of 
discriminant analysis is to define different use case specific 
groups of events. These groups can be created via cluster analysis 
algorithms on the basis of the existing events in the event cloud. 
Of course, a great number of different groups can be defined to 
classify the event-groups more accurately. But to simplify the 
process, this approach is restricted to two groups of events: 
Events which are indicators for credit card fraud and events which 
are not relevant in this sense. After defining the groups, the sec-
ond step is to compute a discriminant function, which differenti-
ates the groups. The parameters of the discriminant function are 
two or more metric event-attributes which have to be appropriate 
for identifying the kind of events and to show differences between 
the groups for the specific use case. If the needed kind of event 
does not have significant metric attributes, the CEP adapter has to 
convert string attributes into metric forms. The third step is to 
determine the critical discriminant value, which will be compared 
with the discriminant value of an event. By using this method, a 
new occurring event can be allocated to one of the – in this case – 
two groups. The following example shows this approach: A per-
son inserts a credit card in an automatic teller machine (ATM) 
followed by changing the password and the withdrawal of money 
within a predefined period of time. This operation creates events 
just like SNMP traps [17]. Some (metric) attributes of these 
events will be included in the predefined discriminant function. 
The resulting discriminant value will be compared with the criti-
cal discriminant value and afterwards allocated to a group of 
events, in this case to the group of suspicious events. The de-
scribed process is executed by the CEP engine in real-time. To 
meet the high performance demand of realizing this process in 
real-time, grid computing can be used respectively splitting the 
event stream and distributing the load to several computers. In the 
meantime, there are first products like Tibco Business Events [16, 
p.30] or Kaskad [16, p.27] which support grid computing. There 
are still some questions which must be answered for the approach 
based on discriminant analysis: 
• Which types of events are created by a credit card transaction 
and which are important to detect credit card fraud? 
• Which attributes of the event types are relevant to differenci-
ate the groups of events for the use case credit card fraud de-
tection? 
• Does the CEP adapter have to change string attributes to 
metric values?  
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4.3 Discriminant Analysis inside a  
Reference Architecture 
Some vendors like IBM, Oracle, or Tibco provide CEP reference 
architectures. Fig. 7 contains the reference model of [3], which is 
designed for “Predictive Business”. The main process of this 
reference model has the following task: It predicts the business 
impact of occurring events or situations by processing real-time 
events together with historical data stored in DB’s. The occurring 
events originate from heterogeneous event sources. The results 
are outputs (e.g. alerts) displayed in an user interface. 
 
Figure 7: CEP reference model [3] 
To achieve the goal of this reference model, there are several 
levels of event processing that events have to pass through: 
• Level 0: Event Pre-processing (normalization, transforma-
tion, data cleansing on raw data) 
• Level 1: Event Refinement (event identification, event track-
ing, event pre-selection, selection of “events of interest”) 
• Level 2: Situation Refinement (situation identification based 
on relationships between event-objects and historical data 
such as signatures, profiles, and other DB info) 
• Level 3: Impact Assessment (estimating the impact of com-
plex events on the organization and business processes) 
• Level 4: Process Refinement (adaptive, dynamic adjustment 
of processes based on the overall processing architecture, in-
cluding turning event sources on/off, bringing new DB’s 
online, changing algorithms, adjusting parameters, filters, 
etc. both automated and with human interaction) 
• Database management: (storing features and patterns ex-
tracted from historical data and other databases e.g. data-
bases of known IP addresses of internet fraudsters) [3] 
To enhance such a reference model, discriminant analysis as 
detection algorithm can be integrated in level 2 (Situation Re-
finement, shown in fig. 8). Here it can be used as an internal 
function for distributing events to different groups (see ch. 4.2).  
But in this context, the computation of the discriminant function 
and the critical discriminant value is not only based on existing 
events but also on parameter values of historical data (e.g. events 
of known fraud attempts) in order to allocate new real-time events 
more exactly to a predefined group of events. So the groups of 
events are more accurate and can represent an unknown pattern of 
events itself. This approach results in a decrease of false positives 
and contributes to solve the problem of VIRT [15]. If an unknown 
pattern is detected and validated, the next step is to update the 
historical data with the new fraud attempt. Afterwards the dis-
criminant function will be computed again and und updated in 
real-time. Thus, the discriminant function becomes more and 
more accurate.  
 
Figure 8: Process of Situation Refinement [3] 
5.  RELATED WORK 
In consideration of known and unknown patterns for the applica-
tion areas intrusion detection and fraud detection and the recogni-
tion of anomalies and intrusions, there is an approach at [19]. That 
method was developed before 2001 and is based on data mining 
approaches with the particular background of real-time processing 
problems. The focus of this work was to develop cost-sensitive 
models for the distribution of “features” to detect and process 
patterns on more areas and secondly their optimal distribution in 
the infrastructure architecture. But now, with CEP technology the 
basis is developed to handle events in real-time, e.g. via grid 
computing technology, as mentioned in paragraph 4.2.  
A further research, according to [22], examines the accuracy of 
probabilistic methods in the field of naive Bayes text classifica-
tion. To be more detailed, the classification accuracy of the mulit-
variate Bernoulli model and the multinomial model are compared. 
In this context, an event is declared as the occurrence of a specific 
word inside a text document. The experiments are based on dif-
ferent data sets just as Yahoo Science, Newsgroups, WebKB and 
the Industry Sector. The research results showed that on the one 
hand the mulit-variate Bernoulli model performs better with small 
vocabulary sizes but on the other hand the multinomial model 
usually is better suited for larger vocabulary sizes. That is only an 
example for applying probabilistic or fuzzy methods from the 
discipline of information retrieval which were already developed 
in the seventies and the following years of the 20th century and 
which could be researched and perhaps adapted for detecting 
unknown event patterns. 
The algorithms, as well as the mathematical and heuristic tech-
niques from fields such as statistics, artificial intelligence, opera-
tions research, digital signal processing, pattern recognition, 
decision theory etc. discussed here are also presented in [4]. In 
that paper a new generation of Intrusion Detection Systems is 
discussed and in the meantime this is going to be one of the main 
applications of CEP. But until today the authors don’t know how 
and whether these sophisticated techniques are really already 
applied in concrete products respectively projects. This is also 
discussed in the work of [5, p.12]. He found out that the existing 
commercial products are not focused on the problem of detecting 
unknown event patterns. His own approach is based on data-
mining and not on CEP. Furthermore, one of his results was that 
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the combination of different methods [5, p.6] (e.g. Bayes network 
of probability of each intrinsic attribute, Matching against non-
self bit-vectors, Hidden Markov Model etc.[5, p.41]) for detecting 
all types of intrusion attacks leads to the recognition that this 
highly specialized approach only works for the domain of intru-
sion detection but can not applied for other domains like online 
fraud detection [5, p.11]. Finally, the first trial of combining 
methods should be implemented in the years after 2004 and ex-
perimental and empirical results are expected these days. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper proposes discriminant analysis as a possible approach 
in order to classify events into specific groups of events where a 
group can represent an unknown pattern itself. But to determine 
the meaning of every specific group of events as well as defining 
the used event parameters for developing the discriminant func-
tion depends on the types of occurring events and on the concern-
ing use-case. At the moment, we implement an experimental 
environment based on a CEP engine in order to test our discrimi-
nant analysis approach. After finishing this step, we are going to 
examine other detection algorithm candidates (see ch. 3.2) as well 
as combinations of these algorithms. Our goal is to evaluate their 
abilities to detect unknown event patterns and to be able to com-
pare the different methods. 
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